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On November 4, 1986, the 35 signatory nations to the Helsinki Final Act convened in Vienna for the third follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. For six weeks there was a thorough exchange of views on the implementation of the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document, as well as discussions for the next phases of review of the Helsinki process.

We are pleased to provide you with a report on the first six weeks of the Vienna meeting during which a basic theme underlined by virtually all Western and Neutral and Non-Aligned states was that there must be significant improvement in the human rights practices of the Eastern nations for the Vienna meeting to be considered a success and for the possibility of making progress in the CSCE process.

We hope you find this report useful.

Sincerely,

Dennis DeConcini
DENNIS DECONCINI
Co-Chairman

STENY H. HOYER
Chairman

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

At the initial session of the third CSCE follow-up meeting held in Vienna from November 4 to December 20, 1986, the Soviet Union and a number of its Warsaw Pact allies came under the most concentrated and concerted attack for human rights abuses since the beginning of the Helsinki process in 1975. In some ways the barrage of criticism directed at the East during the implementation phase of the Vienna Conference was more remarkable for the fact that the Soviet Union for the first time offered a series of gestures, promises and public relations maneuvers specifically designed to soften or mute negative Western assessments of its performance. Partly out of underlying distrust for Soviet motives and partly because of Soviet bumbling or callousness in the death of imprisoned Helsinki Monitor Anatoly Marchenko and the agonizingly delayed departure of cancer patient Rimma Bravve, Western as well as neutral and nonaligned (NNa) participants joined together to mount an unprecedented indictment of Soviet and East European violations of the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. As a result, the calculated Soviet effort under General Secretary Gorbachev to project a new, more open and humane image remained at best open to doubt and at worst suffered a serious loss in credibility.

Already at the beginning of the Vienna Meeting, Secretary of State Shultz – in his opening speech to the plenary and in his illfated bilateral talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze – questioned the reality of this new Soviet image and raised fundamental questions about recent Soviet human rights policy initiatives, including their proposal for a human rights conference in Moscow. The Western delegations of NATO – led by the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada – then proceeded to conduct a thorough, specific and uninhibited review of the compliance record of the Soviet Union and other Eastern states from the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 to the present. Western nations and neutral states alike pointed out time and again that the record over this period had not only not improved in major respects but in many areas had worsened. Some of the neutral and nonaligned participants were so outraged by events such as the death of Soviet imprisoned dissident Marchenko that, for the first time, they singled out the Soviet Union and its individual victims by name. In fact, in addition to a massive cataloguing of systemic human rights abuses by the Soviet Union and its Eastern allies, more names of individual sufferers were mentioned than ever before. The basic theme underlined by virtually all Western and NNa states throughout the first session was that there must be significant improvement in the human rights practices of the Eastern countries, above all the Soviet Union, for the Vienna Meeting to be considered a success and for the possibility of making progress in the CSCE process.

The Soviets, and to some extent their allies, responded to this overwhelming assault on their human rights record in a combination of ways. First, they largely abandoned the traditional Eastern tactic of declaring Western human rights criticism interference in

their internal affairs in violation of Principle VI of the Final Act. Instead they resorted to a more activist strategy involving a mix of two main elements – much talk and some gestures suggesting a shift in their human rights policies and, simultaneously, a vicious counterattack against alleged instances of massive human rights violations in the West, particularly in the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada but ultimately including any delegation sharply critical of Eastern practices. At the same time, consistent with the newly-proclaimed policy of "openness," the Soviet delegation in particular displayed an unprecedented willingness to meet with Western government officials – including congressional visitors, leaders of nongovernmental organizations and even private individuals – to discuss a variety of human rights concerns, especially questions involving divided families or separated spouses. Occasionally, but not often, they purported to respond directly to Western criticisms, but rarely did their response suggest a disposition to change their ways.

Nevertheless, most Western delegations were prepared to give the Soviets and their allies some credit for the limited gestures offered, mainly in the hope of encouraging further such behavior. Ironically, Soviet mishandling of some of their more dramatic gestures may have caused greater suspicion and frustration among Western delegations than if there had been no gestures at all. Whatever hope ultimately there may be at the Vienna Conference for significant improvement in Soviet and Eastern human rights behavior, the first session of the meeting did not produce encouraging results.

Following a final week of implementation review when the meeting resumes on January 27, the second session will be devoted to consideration of new proposals and initial drafting of a possible substantive concluding document. At a minimum such a document, by prior agreement, must set the time and place for the next review meeting. Whether, like the Madrid Meeting, a Vienna concluding document will contain new commitments for the implementation of the Final Act and a new schedule of specialized experts meeting will depend on a number of factors.

A fundamental demand for the Western countries of the NATO alliance is that there must be significant improvement in Eastern human rights compliance before the end of the Vienna Meeting. Some 11 years after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, there is widespread agreement even among many of the neutral and nonaligned states that more words and meetings alone are not sufficient to maintain public credibility in the process. The United States, in particular, maintains that the integrity and credibility of the CSCE requires balanced progress in all aspects of the Final Act.

In the second phase of the Vienna Meeting, the participating States will examine a number of major new proposals and begin to consider what is negotiable. The Soviet Union and its allies have already tabled a small number of proposals covering the major areas of the Final Act and are well positioned to begin the next phase. Two of the more significant Eastern proposals are the Polish proposal for a Stockholm follow-up conference on confidence- and security-building measures and conventional disarmament, and a surprising Soviet proposal for a meeting on human rights and

human contacts in Moscow. The Western and NNa states will be coming in with proposals of their own soon after the meeting resumes. At the December NATO meeting in Brussels, the Western Foreign Ministers emphasized the importance of human rights implementation and balance in the CSCE. They also expressed a willingness to engage both in a continuation of the Stockholm negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures and in discussion of a mandate for negotiations on the reduction of conventional forces, although it was left unspecified whether such a discussion should take place within or outside the CSCE.

The future of the Vienna Conference and the Helsinki process itself could very well hinge on how further CSCE military security negotiations are handled within the process. Of critical importance is how they are balanced with human rights issues and, most importantly, whether they are accompanied by a significant and continuing improvement in Soviet and East bloc human rights performance. History has shown that the prospect of military security negotiations in the CSCE provides an incentive for progress in Eastern human rights performance. The challenge at Vienna is to ensure that the military security component not assume such a large role that it overwhelms all the other elements, including human rights.

ORGANIZATION OF THE MEETING

The organization of the Vienna Meeting is modeled closely on the pattern established for the 1980-83 Madrid Follow-up Conference. The structure of the meeting is divided into three parts: implementation review, new proposals and drafting of a concluding document. The first part, implementation review, will end on January 30, with its final 2 weeks devoted to both review and proposals. This will be followed by 3 weeks solely devoted to consideration of proposals. Drafting on a concluding document will begin February 19 and last until at least July 31, which is the target date for the end of the meeting. However, given past experience (3 years at Madrid) and the number and complexity of issues involved at Vienna, most observers and participants believe that the meeting will extend beyond July 31.

Although modeled on the Madrid formula, the organization of the Vienna Meeting is different in several significant ways. The length of the implementation review was extended from 5 to 7 weeks and the period for new proposals was reduced to 3 weeks, while the time allocated for drafting a concluding document has been stretched to some 4 months at Vienna. Other important changes at Vienna include the provision for additional meetings open to the public (at the beginning and end of each phase), a strengthened, almost ironclad commitment to a further follow-up meeting after Vienna, and an agreement to open the meeting at the political level, which in practice meant attendance by Foreign Ministers. At Madrid, by contrast, it was heads of delegation, not Foreign Ministers, who gave the opening speeches.

Following the first week of opening speeches by the Foreign Ministers the Vienna Meeting went into closed session and turned to a

more detailed examination of implementation issues. For the United States, head of delegation Ambassador Zimmermann delivered two speeches and Commission Cochairman (and delegation Vice-Chairman) Steny Hoyer gave a third. During the first 5 weeks, the implementation review was organized into a very tightly-scheduled series of plenaries (thrice weekly) and meetings of the five subsidiary working bodies (SWBs). The five SWBs covered the principal areas of the Final Act – Baskets I (Principles and Military Security), II (Economic and Scientific Cooperation), III (Humanitarian Issues), Mediterranean Questions, and Follow-up (post-Vienna activities). The last week of the session – like the first of the next session – was devoted both to implementation review and to consideration of new proposals.

The structure of the meeting will remain basically the same during the next phases of the Vienna Conference, although the frequency of meetings will vary somewhat as time goes on. All the delegations felt pressured by the heavy schedule during the first phase and have agreed to reduce the load beginning in January 1987 to allow more time for behind-the-scenes consultation and preparation.

U.S. DELEGATION

The U.S. delegation is headed by Ambassador Warren Zimmermann. During the first phase Helsinki Commission Chairman Alfonse D'Amato and Cochairman Steny Hoyer served as Vice-Chairmen. The two deputy heads of the delegation are Ambassadors Robert Frowick of the State Department and Samuel Wise, Deputy Director of the Commission. The rest of the delegation is comprised of officials and staff members from the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Departments of State and Defense, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the U.S. Information Agency. CSCE Commissioners and other Members of Congress who visited for the Review Meeting were also appointed U.S. delegates.

Cochairman Hoyer led a congressional delegation to Vienna on November 8-12. The Hoyer group included Commissioners Claiborne Pell and Dennis DeConcini from the Senate. Also participating were Senators Paul Sarbanes and Charles Grassley, and Representative Thomas Luken. Representative Dante B. Fascell, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and former Commission Chairman, led another congressional group to Vienna during the period November 18 - 22 following the North Atlantic Assembly Meeting in Istanbul, Turkey. This delegation included Representatives Jack Brooks, Charles Rose, Frank Annunzio, Robert Garcia, Sherwood Boehlert, Frank Horton, Gerald B. H. Solomon, Bart Gordon, Cardiss Collins, Thomas E. Petri, Bill Richardson, Patricia Schroeder, Howard L. Berman, Lawrence J. Smith, Lee Hamilton, Benjamin Gilman, Tom Lantos and Doug Bereuter. CSCE Commission Chairman D'Amato travelled to Vienna for the closing week of the first phase (December 14 - 18).

Prior to the opening of the Vienna Meeting, President Reagan appointed 15 Public Members to the U.S. delegation. The Public

Members represent a variety of civic, human rights and ethnic constituencies and organizations from across the country. Their inclusion on the delegation provides the professional staff with valuable knowledge, expertise and advice. Moreover, they act as liaisons for the U.S. delegation with the various American organizations and interest groups represented in Vienna.

The Public Members are Mr. Morris Abram (National Conference on Soviet Jewry and Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations), Mr. Robert Bernstein (U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee), Mr. James W. Cicconi (the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer and Feld), Ms. Rita E. Hauser (International Parliamentary Group for Human Rights in the Soviet Union), Mr. Malcolm Hoenlein (Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations), Mr. William Korey (B'nai B'rith), Mr. Julian Kulas (Ukrainian American community), Mr. Aloysius Mazewski (Polish American Congress), Mr. Michael Novak (American Enterprise Institute), Dr. Olgerts Pavlovskis (World Federation of Free Latvians), Mr. Dennis Prager (Union of Councils for Soviet Jews), Mr. John W. Riehm (Freedom House), Mr. Bayard Rustin (A. Philip Randolph Educational Fund), Mr. Steven M. Umin (Williams and Connolly) and Mr. W. Bruce Weinrod (The Heritage Foundation).

The presence on the U.S. delegation of so many influential citizens from so wide a cross-section of American society helped to demonstrate to the other conference participants the importance the U.S. Government attaches to CSCE and the integral role that the individual plays in that process.

CONGRESSIONAL ACTIVITIES IN VIENNA

The first session of the Vienna Review Meeting prompted a number of visits by Commissioners and other Members of Congress to participate in the plenaries and in bilateral discussions with members of several delegations to the Vienna Meeting.

Cochairman Steny Hoyer addressed a plenary meeting on November 11 in which he emphasized the centrality of human rights in the Helsinki process. Trust between nations, he said, depends on respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. He underscored the gap between Soviet and East Bloc commitments and compliance – and noted the difficulty of sustaining confidence in the Helsinki process and reducing tensions around the world in the face of continuing violations by the East.

Cochairman Hoyer held extensive bilateral meetings with the Soviet and Polish delegations, in which he addressed the Helsinki Commission's human rights concerns forcefully and in depth. The Cochairman also participated in a number of NGO-sponsored activities. At one, he was joined by Commissioners Dennis DeConcini and Claiborne Pell at a press conference commemorating the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Ukrainian and Lithuanian Helsinki Monitoring Groups. In addition, Cochairman Hoyer hosted a lunch for NATO Ambassadors as well as a reception for the NGOs, Secretariat and representatives of various delegations.

Commissioner Dante Fascell also led a group to Vienna in mid-November. They, too, held a bilateral meeting on human rights with the Soviet delegation and attended plenary sessions.

Chairman Alfonse D'Amato participated in the Vienna Follow-up Meeting in mid-December, addressing a plenary session and meeting with a number of NATO and Warsaw Pact representatives. Focusing in his plenary speech on the human dimension of the CSCE process, D'Amato described the suffering that results from Eastern noncompliance with the humanitarian and human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and Madrid Concluding Document. D'Amato called for the release of all imprisoned monitors, an end to psychiatric abuse of prisoners, increased emigration, and a freer flow of information. The Chairman made clear that any proposals put forward in Vienna would be considered in light of compliance with existing commitments, warning that the CSCE faces a crisis of credibility in the absence of substantially improved compliance by the East.

PUBLIC AND NGO ACTIVITIES

A large number of United States, Canadian and European non-governmental organizations (NGOs), primarily in the human rights field, conducted activities in Vienna to coincide with the official CSCE meeting. The opening weeks in particular witnessed a strong presence of U.S. based or affiliated NGOs and their representatives. Several hundred representatives from over 50 U.S. groups held various demonstrations, press conferences, religious services, symposia and exhibits mirroring the diversity of human rights concerns during the 7-week long opening and review phase of the meeting.

During the first week of the Conference, a group of NGOs cooperated to organize press conferences, panel discussions and over 20 information booths under the aegis of a Resistance International exhibition. This extensive "Helsinki Mirror" effort included features on political prisoners, religious persecution and Afghanistan, as well as various human, religious, minority and national rights concerns.

Other major NGO activities included a press conference by Council of Free Czechoslovakia, the Polish Government in Exile and the Ukrainian Government in Exile; a Baltic World Council press conference, demonstration, and ecumenical Mass; an International Cancer Patients' Solidarity Committee press conference; an International Helsinki Federation panel discussion on "The Value of the Helsinki Process"; an Amnesty International demonstration and panel discussion; a Divided Spouses Coalition press conference; a press conference on the 10th Anniversary of the Ukrainian and Lithuanian Helsinki Groups; Latvian National Day celebration; a memorial Mass and procession commemorating the 30th anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution; a press conference organized by the World Conference on Soviet Jewry International Council; an International Parliamentary Group hearing and press conference on religious rights in the U.S.S.R.; and a symposium on human rights violations in Romania. Members of the U.S. delegation, in-

cluding Ambassadors Zimmermann, Wise and Frowick, when available, attended all of these events.

In addition to the above mentioned groups, United States and U.S. affiliated organizations represented in Vienna included: Helsinki Watch, Freedom House, the Sakharov International Committee, the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews, Soviet Jewry Education and Information Center, New York Coalition to Free Soviet Jews, Interreligious Task Force on Soviet Jewry, World Jewish Congress, Estonian American National Council, the Lithuanian World Community, Lithuanian Information Center, Lithuanian American Council, Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania, World Federation of Free Latvians, World Congress of Free Ukrainians, Smoloskyp-Ukrainian Information Service, Americans for Human Rights in Ukraine, Ukrainian-American Coordinating Council, External Representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, Congress of Russian Americans, Hungarian Human Rights Foundation, Coordinating Committee of Hungarian Organizations in North America, Czechoslovak National Council of America, Crimean Tatars Initiative Group, Freedom of Communications, American Foreign Policy Institute, Coordinating Office of Solidarity and International Society for Human Rights, and the Human Rights Law Association.

To assist visiting Americans and NGO representatives, the U.S. delegation established a public liaison office. This office provided NGOs with information, facilitated access to the conference site and arranged interviews with press, as well as meetings with U.S. delegates and representatives from other participating States. The U.S. delegation held formal NGO briefings and numerous meetings, both formal and informal, with NGO representatives. During the opening week, U.S. Ambassador to Austria, Ronald Lauder, hosted a reception for NGO representatives, attended by over 250 people, including Secretary of State Shultz already mentioned.

In a continuation and expansion of the Bern experience, where the Soviets met with a small number of NGOs, in Vienna members of the Soviet delegation met with considerably more. The Soviets, however, refused to meet with Alexei Semyonov, the son of Elena Bonner.

SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS

Prisoners of Conscience

During the first phase of the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting, the United States and other Western delegations focused considerable attention on Soviet human rights violations. The Soviets, to mitigate Western criticism, perhaps in an attempt resolved six high-profile prisoner of conscience cases before, during and immediately following the first phase of the Vienna Meeting. These actions, however, were marred by the tragic death of imprisoned writer, Anatoly Marchenko. This incident underscored the fact that the release of a few dissidents, while a welcome development, did not necessarily signal fundamental changes in Soviet human rights practices.

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Before the start of the Vienna Meeting, Soviet authorities resolved the cases of two prominent prisoners of conscience, Moscow Helsinki Group leader, Yuri Orlov, and noted poet, Irina Ratushinskaya. Linked to the Daniloff-Zakharov journalist-spy exchange, Yuri Orlov suddenly was transferred from his place of Siberian exile to Moscow. On October 5, he and his wife Irina Valitova arrived in the United States. Upon receiving him at the White House on October 7, President Reagan hailed Orlov as a "hero of our time." On October 9, Irina Ratushinskaya was released from labor camp. When Helsinki Commission staffers contacted Ratushinskaya by phone on October 10, she said her release had been totally unexpected. She and her husband Igor Gerashchenko were allowed to travel to England on December 18 so that Ratushinskaya could get medical treatment for a heart and lung condition. After a reception with Prime Minister Thatcher on December 23, the couple announced that they intended to stay in the West.

Toward the end of the first session of the Vienna Meeting, Soviet leader Gorbachev telephoned Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Andrei Sakharov on December 17 to tell him that his 7-year banishment in Gorky had ended. On December 23, Sakharov and his wife Elena Bonner returned to Moscow surrounded by dozens of newsmen. Sakharov repeated his call for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan (which 7 years ago led to his forced exile to Gorki) and for an amnesty for political prisoners.

Two days later Larisa Chukaeva a peace activist was released from her 2-year labor camp term on December 25; Nina Kovalenko was released from a psychiatric hospital before Christmas, and arrived in Vienna on January 8.

However positive these steps, they nevertheless took place in the larger context of ongoing and systemic human rights violations in the Soviet Union. Soviet authorities continued to enforce repressive laws and hold thousands of Soviet prisoners of conscience in the *Gulag* and psychiatric hospitals.

Tragically emblematic of chronic Soviet human rights problems was the death of imprisoned veteran writer and worker, Anatoly Marchenko, on December 8 – 2 days before International Human Rights Day and amid indications that he was going to be released. Marchenko, 48, had spent over 20 years in Soviet labor camps. In 1967, he authored *My Testimony*, the first expose of the post-Stalinist camps. Nine years later, he helped found the Moscow Helsinki Group. In 1981, Marchenko was sentenced to 10 years camp plus 5 years exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." Transferred to the notorious Chistopol Prison, Marchenko began a hunger strike on August 4 to protest prison conditions. In an appeal he smuggled out to the participants in the Vienna Meeting, he called his treatment "an assembly line to annihilation." Marchenko died of unknown causes in Chistopol Prison. (After his death, two other well-known prisoners of conscience, Sergei Grigoryants and Valery Senderov, decided to continue Marchenko's fast.)

In September, another – though less publicized – show of repressive human rights policies took place when Soviet authorities sentenced Russian Orthodox deacon, Vladimir Rusak, to 7 years in strict regimen camps and 5 years exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." Rusak had written an open letter to the 1983

World Council of Churches meeting in Vancouver, recounting his own difficulties and the plight of the Russian Orthodox Church.

Emigration

Although general levels of emigration remain very low, the Soviet Union used the first phase of the Vienna Meeting to announce the resolution of a few high profile emigration cases. On the eve of the Vienna Meeting, the longest standing refusenik case ended when Benjamin Bogomolny was allowed to emigrate with his wife. On November 20, Soviet CSCE Ambassador Yuri Kashlev announced that 3-year-old Kaisa Randpere would be permitted to join her parents in Sweden and cancer patient Rimma Bravve would be allowed to join her mother and sister in the United States. These cases had received a great deal of attention both within and outside of the meeting. Unfortunately, for either bureaucratic or other reasons, the seriously ill Rimma Bravve was not actually permitted to emigrate until 4 weeks later.

Other resolved cases included 2 of the 16 divided spouses on the U.S. Government representation list, Lydia Jachno and Sonia Melnikova-Eichenvald. Also, cancer patient Ina Kitrosskaya-Meiman was informed on December 20 that she would be allowed to leave the Soviet Union to receive treatment in the United States. However, Soviet authorities refused her husband, Jewish refusenik and Moscow Helsinki Monitor Naum Meiman, permission to leave.*

In another development, the Soviet delegation announced on November 6 the publication of new emigration rules that regulate applications by Soviet citizens and foreigners for entering and leaving the U.S.S.R. The law, which was expected to go into effect January 1, marks the first time that Soviet emigration policy has been made public, but it appears to be little more than a codification of past practice. Some observers even believe that it represents a step backward.

PRESS

The prospect that the opening sessions of the Vienna Conference would provide the occasion for the first post-Reykjavik meeting between Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze threatened to shift initial press attention away from CSCE. For example, the New York *Times* reported on November 5 that the Conference opened "amid expectations that American and Soviet delegations will use it as a backdrop to clarify and possibly advance the discussion at the summit meeting last month in Iceland."

As it turned out, the significant press interest generated by the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting actually rubbed off on CSCE, and particularly on human rights issues. The more than 1,100 accredited journalists covering the events in Vienna found themselves exposed to extensive NGO activities and to the determination by Western nations to hold the East accountable for noncompliance

*Ina Kitrosskaya-Meiman died February 9. Her husband was refused permission to travel to the West to attend her furneral.

with its Helsinki human rights commitments. An article by *U.S. News and World Report* (November 17, 1986) suggested that human rights issues "stole the political show" at the opening sessions.

Perhaps the most notable media development at the Vienna Conference was the Soviet delegation's new attitude of "openness" toward human rights concerns, a reflection not only of Secretary Gorbachev's *glasnost* policy but also the recognition that human rights issues damage Soviet credibility. In previous conferences, the Soviet Union met charges of human rights violations with silence, counterattacks or defensiveness. This changed in Vienna, where the Soviets conducted what the international edition of *Time Magazine* (November 17, 1986) called "a public relations blitz aimed at defusing the sensitive issue."

American media reaction to the new Soviet approach ranged from factual to skeptical. A *Christian Science Monitor* article (November 5, 1986) reflected general sentiment by describing it as "professional" and "sophisticated," noting that "Moscow has become acutely conscious of the need for a good image." A New York *Times* editorial of November 10 commented that the "new Soviet refrain on human rights emanating from the Conference in Vienna" amounts to little more than Soviet diplomats proffering "honeyed words and a studied willingness to hear out individual protesters."

The impact of the Soviet public relations offensive on the Conference delegates seems to have been negligible. The Los Angeles *Times*, for example, noted on December 20, 1986 that even the release of Andrei Sakharov on the day before the Conference recessed for Christmas "ironically . . . served mainly to heighten the human rights issue here and to sharpen the language of the closing speeches." The reporter added that "unlike previous Review Conferences, in Madrid and Belgrade, the one here has been characterized from the outset by attacks on the Soviet Union, not only from the Western countries but from the nonaligned countries as well."

For the American press, the Vienna Conference served as an opportunity to focus on the Helsinki process and associated human rights concerns. In the days and months leading up to the Conference, the editorial pages of various major newspapers ran columns on prospects for the upcoming meeting and the need to link human rights to progress in other areas of East-West relations.

When the Conference began, the major American newspapers, newsweeklies, wire services, radio and television networks were all present in Vienna. Also active were representatives from the ethnic community press. The U.S. delegation to the Conference made every effort to provide background material for the press and to arrange interviews with the media. As the Conference proceeded, much of the press left Vienna, though interest in the Conference remained as evidenced by periodic reports on the proceedings. After the initial rush of general stories on human rights, the press tended to focus on more specific issues raised at Vienna, including Afghanistan, Soviet emigration practices, divided families, and military security matters. Also receiving considerable press coverage was the U.S. reaction to the death of Anatoly Marchenko and the impact of his death on world opinion.

While not overlooking human rights issues, Western European press coverage naturally emphasized Europe's stake in the CSCE process. On November 8, for example, Germany's Stuttgarter *Zeitung* stated that "the Helsinki Final Act has proved a kind of constitution governing the whole range of European efforts to step up cooperation." Vienna's *Kurier* remarked on December 9 that "in the shadow" of superpower confrontation other things are happening in Vienna. "It will again be the neutrals," said *Kurier*, "which by their mediation in the eleventh hour will straighten out the CSCE mess . . . here in Vienna."

Many Western European journalists attempted to interpret the impact of the new Soviet "openness" on the Helsinki process. Some thought it a warning to the United States to pay more attention to Europe's needs and not to surrender political ground to the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, as the *Economist* put it on November 8, "a good many people" know the "real meaning and importance of Helsinki" – that is, the human rights component.

The Soviet and East European press viewed the Vienna Conference quite differently from the West, suggesting that Western human rights concerns were part of a larger scheme to divert attention from military and economic matters affecting Europe. When mentioning human rights conditions in their own nations, Soviet and East European press would usually speak of advances already made and further progress to come. They also praised the Soviet proposal for a Moscow meeting on humanitarian affairs.

Soviet writers in particular took every opportunity to cast the Soviet Union as a European nation, supportive of human rights, and to impugn the motives and human rights record of the United States. No nation, they wrote, has a monopoly on the interpretation of human rights. *Pravda* commented on November 4, for example, that the United States "is trying to divert close public scrutiny from" Reykjavik and other security matters "by expatiating with equal persistence and hypocrisy about 'human rights.' " Conversely, the Soviet press praised the Soviet Union as a proponent of "pan-European" issues and true balance in the Helsinki process. As for the NGOs and human rights activists who came to Vienna to protest Soviet human rights practices, TASS called them "anti-Sovieteers" and implied that they were stooges of "right-wing radical circles of the NATO countries."

PLENARY

As was the case at Belgrade and Madrid, the plenary served as the focal point of discussions during the first session in Vienna. Plenary meetings during the first week were open as in the past, and, as a result of a push by the West for increased openness in the CSCE, so was the final plenary of the session. The presence of Foreign Ministers from many of the participating States attracted considerable coverage during the opening week of the meeting. The Ministers set the tone for the meeting in their opening speeches.

Secretary of State Shultz addressed the plenary on November 5, presenting an overview of East-West relations. While attempting to build upon the progress made during the Reykjavik meeting be-

tween President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, Shultz remained tough on human rights. Underscoring the link between human rights and security, he expressed disappointment at the lack of progress in implementing the commitments made in Helsinki and Madrid. He made specific reference to a wide-range of human rights violations in Eastern Europe. The Secretary's criticisms were not limited to the Soviet Union, but included a number of specific references to abuses by other Eastern countries as well. Foreign Ministers from other Western nations also concentrated on human rights and humanitarian concerns.

While the West focused on implementation, the East concentrated on security issues in the aftermath of the Reykjavik meeting and the adoption of an agreement at the CDE in Stockholm. The East attempted to avoid criticism of its human rights record and direct attention to new proposals such as the conference on humanitarian issues in Moscow proposed by Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.

Ambassador Warren Zimmermann, head of the U.S. delegation, addressed the plenary during the second week of the conference. In a call for openness and candor, Zimmermann stressed the human dimension of the Helsinki process while reiterating the linkage between human rights and security. He underscored the importance of implementation to the CSCE. In keeping with past practice, the United States raised specific cases both in plenary and the subsidiary working bodies. In all, more than 130 cases illustrating specific problem areas were raised in this manner.

During the remaining 5 weeks of the session, the Conference met in plenary three times a week. The U.S. delegation used these opportunities to review various aspects of implementation, including: treatment of Helsinki monitors, human contacts, national minorities, divided spouses, free flow of information, self-determination, emigration, free trade unions, and the persecution of believers. Despite Soviet claims that there would be no taboos during the discussions in Vienna, the East failed to respond to many of the questions and concerns raised by the West. In an attempt to divert attention away from their human rights record, the Soviets and other Eastern states resorted to countercharges against the West on social and economic issues such as unemployment, homelessness, and racism.

Among the recurring issues discussed in plenary was the continued Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. In a comprehensive speech on Afghanistan, Ambassador Samuel Wise, deputy head of the U.S. delegation, discussed the human tragedy of the 7-year-old Soviet occupation. Wise underscored the fact Soviet actions in Afghanistan violate each of the principles contained in the Final Act. Wise repeated United States calls for the immediate withdrawal of the more than 100,000 Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

The death of Anatoly Marchenko during the fifth week of general debate served to galvanize the Western countries, including a number of neutrals, on the issue of human rights. Ambassador Zimmermann set aside one minute during the course of a speech as a silent tribute to Marchenko, resulting in a walkout by the Soviet and Bulgarian delegations. In response to the intense criticism over Marchenko's death, the Soviets leveled their strongest attacks on

the West. The Western delegations in turn joined together to send a telegram of condolences to Marchenko's widow.

During the closing days of the session, the West remained unified in its condemnation of Eastern human rights abuses and the need for implementation of all provisions of the Final Act. The Soviets and their allies, meanwhile, focused on Eastern proposals including the Polish proposal on CDE, the Soviet initiative on a Moscow humanitarian conference, and the Czechoslovak proposal on Basket II.

BASKET I

Overview

As at Belgrade and Madrid, the sessions of the Subsidiary Working Body (SWB) for Basket I at Vienna were equally divided into the two main components stipulated in the Final Act: Principles and Military Security. The Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies took the predictable tack. In the security discussions, they pushed for concessions from the West that they had not been able to secure at Stockholm: a new mandate encompassing air and naval maneuvers not connected with maneuvers on the European Continent, inclusion of North American territory in the zone of applicability, and a non-use of force treaty. The Poles proposed a second stage of the Stockholm Conference which would encompass negotiations on conventional forces reductions. When discussing principles, the Warsaw Pact relied heavily on its conception of detente and disarmament as the ultimate expression of the Helsinki principles. The West, on the other hand, emphasized the relationship between implementation of principles and genuine security. Calling attention to specific Soviet and East Bloc failures under Principles VII through X, as well as shortcomings in implementing the confidence-building measures agreed to in the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, Western nations argued that it was the East's poor implementation record that undermined security between the participating States.

For the most part, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and, in the latter stages, France, played the major role in addressing compliance failures under the Principles rubric of "S" SWB. The Soviet Union and Czechoslovaks, as the main recipients of the criticism, carried the cudgel for the East.

Implementation Review: Principles

Luxembourg set the tone for the West early in the "S" group talks by stating that "the development of Principle VII is the key to success of the Conference," and the Federal Republic of Germany welcomed the fact that the "taboo" against frankness in reviewing implementation had passed. Thereafter, the NATO allies focused, with varying degrees of intensity, on human rights violations in the East, particularly the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

The U.S. and U.K. delegations were noticeably active in cataloguing Soviet and Czechoslovak human rights violations, noting several victims by name, while Canada concentrated on the brutality of

the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. At one point, the Italian delegation specifically highlighted the legitimate demands of Latvian, Lithuanian, Estonian, and Jewish groups for their linguistic, cultural, and religious rights. The news of the death of imprisoned Moscow Helsinki Monitor Anatoly Marchenko, followed by U.N. Human Rights Day (December 10), brought other allies and neutral and nonaligned states into the fray.

The Soviet approach to Basket I discussions of human rights principles at Vienna contrasted sharply with the main thrust of the Soviet approach at Madrid, where they argued at length that Western criticism was an inadmissible interference into their internal affairs. Thus, at Vienna, the Soviet and Czechoslovak delegations downplayed the interference argument and responded by accusing their most vocal critics of alleged human rights violations in their own countries. The United States, United Kingdom, and Canada were subjected to lengthy speeches about racism and insensivity to the plight of the poor – and were accused of supporting "terrorist bandits" in Afghanistan. (At one point, however, the Soviets took a third approach: responding to a reference by U.S. deputy head of delegation Frowick to the continued Soviet occupation of the Baltic States, Soviet representative Shikalov interrupted his angry response in Russian to assert, in English, that "we couldn't care less.") Specific questions posed by the United Kingdom and others to the Soviets on the issue of human rights violations remained by and large unanswered.

Unlike Madrid, the Soviet and Eastern delegations generally avoided lengthy speeches about their own exemplary implementation of principles – the East having realized, perhaps, that its increasing inability to support these claims was self-defeating. Instead, the Soviets and Warsaw Pact states concentrated on the "detente and disarmament" aspect of the Helsinki principles and related initiatives in this area to pass for implementation. One departure from this approach, however, was when Soviet representative Shikalov recited Soviet statistics on the number of churches, prayer houses, synagogues, and houses of worship in the Soviet Union in response to charges of religious repression in his country.

The United States made six major speeches in SWB "S" on the subject of implementation, a detailed reply to Soviet attacks on U.S. policy toward Nicaragua, and shorter interventions in support of allied statements when the occasion arose. In separate speeches, Ambassador Robert Frowick addressed implementation of all 10 Helsinki principles, U.S. implementation of same, and Principle VIII ("Equal rights and self-determination of people"). Ambassador Sam Wise delivered speeches on Principle VII ("Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms"), Principle IX ("Cooperation among states") and Principle X ("Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law").

Implementation Review: Military Security

The review of military security issues served to highlight the different approaches to confidence-building within the CSCE by the East and West. Western and neutral countries devoted considerable attention to implementation of the confidence-building measures (CBMs) contained in the Final Act and the Madrid mandate on the

Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE). The East, on the other hand, attempted to divert attention by introducing new proposals and raising issues such as U.S. support of the Afghan freedom fighters, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and the American intervention in Grenada, among others.

While there was general agreement among the participants that implementation of CBMs had improved since Madrid, Western nations expressed concerns that the East continued to provide a minimal amount of information on Warsaw Pact military maneuvers in their notifications. During the course of the review, the U.S. delegation and other Western countries pointed out continuing problems with the quality and quantity of information contained in Eastern notifications. These often failed to include data, called for under the Final Act, on the size, area, purpose, force components, and time frame of maneuvers. The Soviets attempted to minimize this criticism by maintaining that these provisions merely serve as guidelines, not requirements. NATO and neutral countries consistently provide detailed information regarding their military maneuvers.

Many of the Western delegations also pressed the Warsaw Pact states on their failure to implement the discretionary CBMs – such as notification of smaller-scale maneuvers involving fewer than 25,000 troops, and the exchange of observers. Although participating States are not required to provide notification of smaller-scale maneuvers, they are encouraged to do so in an effort to foster increased confidence and openness. Western states regularly make such notification. While it was acknowledged that the East had provided its first voluntary notification of a smaller-scale exercise during 1983, the Warsaw states came under increasing criticism for their general failure to provide notification of such maneuvers. Responding on behalf of the East, the Soviets argued that the only requirement contained in the Final Act is the notification of maneuvers involving more than 25,000 troops, and that the Warsaw Pact states had consistently complied with that provision. In addition, the Soviets linked implementation of CBMs with the general atmosphere in East-West relations, noting that during periods of increased tension, such as the early 1980's, states could not be expected to implement such measures. Pointing out the irony of the Soviet position, the Western delegations underscored the importance of CBMs particularly during periods of heightened tensions.

During the course of the review, considerable attention was focused on the progress of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE). The East tried to capitalize on the momentum produced by the agreement in Stockholm by proposing to advance the CDE to its next stage. Poland tabled a proposal during the closing days of the session calling for the negotiation of a new mandate for the CDE and the inclusion of conventional forces reduction talks within the CSCE. The NATO countries have called for negotiations to build upon and expand the results of the Stockholm Conference, and for distinct negotiations on a mandate for conventional forces reduction.

BASKET II

The agenda for the Vienna Meeting allowed for 29 sessions of the Basket II Subsidiary Working Body. At the first session, the participants agreed to devote nine subsequent sessions to discussion of trade; four to industrial cooperation; five to cooperation in science and technology; four to cooperation in environmental protection; four to other Basket II topics such as transportation, tourism, migrant labor and personnel training; and two for any additional discussions.

Implementation Review

The subsidiary body held a thorough review of Basket II implementation. The United States, the United Kingdom (on behalf of the European Community), and the Federal Republic of Germany led the way in pointing out shortcomings in Eastern implementation and in defending the West's Basket II compliance record.

The U.S. delegation made 10 Basket II statements in Vienna, 2 in plenary and 8 in the working body. The first speech to the working body outlined the U.S. approach and commitment to Basket II implementation. The Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document, the United States said, cannot be implemented selectively. Concrete steps in other areas of CSCE, it added, are necessary for constructive progress in Basket II. Other Western delegations supported this need for balanced progress, noting that the Madrid Document emphasized implementation of all the provisions as an essential basis for developing greater cooperation in economic, scientific and environmental fields. Several Eastern delegations took a different interpretation of balance, claiming that Basket II had been neglected and should therefore receive added attention.

During the discussions on trade, the United States and other Western delegations made statements citing specific problems with Eastern Basket II compliance, including continuing inadequacies in business contacts and facilities, the lack of accurate economic and commercial information, and difficulties created by Eastern countertrade practices (which require Western firms selling a product to accept other products as partial or total payment). Generally, distinctions were made on the different levels of implementation among the Eastern states. For example, contacts between Western seller firms and Eastern end-user enterprises are much worse in the Soviet Union and Romania than in Poland and Hungary, and the frequency and severity of countertrade demands are greater in Czechoslovakia and Romania than they are in Hungary and the Soviet Union. Positive note was made of modest improvements in the performance of some Eastern countries since Madrid as well as potential improvements on the horizon, such as the Soviet Union's recent announcement that it will reorganize its foreign trade structure. Despite such improvements, however, the West argued that the centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union need to become much more open in order to encourage increased East-West trade.

Eastern delegations attempted to defend their records. They denied, for example, that there was a lack of information on their

economies or of contacts with end-users of Western products. They claimed that meetings of bilateral economic councils -- consisting of trade officials from an Eastern country and business representatives from a Western country -- permitted extensive contacts and exchange of information. Some Eastern delegations, primarily from the Soviet Union and Poland, attacked the West for imposing export controls and sanctions, denying most-favored-nation (MFN) trade status and access to official credit facilities, as well as placing quantitative restrictions on imports. These attacks were relatively restrained, however, reflecting an apparent desire to keep discussion positive so as not to jeopardize chances to obtain increased economic benefits from the West through Basket II commitments.

Nevertheless, Western delegates answered the criticisms of their compliance record. The U.S. delegation defended Western trade policies, arguing that every country maintains the right to determine trade policies in light of its national security and foreign policy interests. It also pointed to the contradiction in Eastern statements supporting the benefits of state control of all foreign trade activity on the one hand and condemning the West for its controls on the other. The U.S. delegation also pointed to the many positive developments in its trade relations with the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Overall, the West succeeded in keeping the East on the defensive regarding trade facilitation.

The discussion of industrial cooperation repeated many of the issues raised in the trade discussion, namely the problems faced by Western firms trying to conduct profitable business with enterprises in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The West also raised issues unique to industrial cooperation, such as the protection of property rights and the repatriation of profits. Western delegates welcomed the promulgation of new legislation or the revision of earlier legislation to improve the legal framework for joint ventures in the East. The Soviet delegation spoke in detail on the new law permitting joint ventures with Western firms on Soviet territory. Two specialists from Prague joined the Czechoslovak delegation to explain the parameters of Western participation in joint ventures in Czechoslovakia, which have been permitted only since 1985. The East continued to attack Western export controls, focusing primarily on the United States. The U.S. repeated its defense of these controls and argued that the East has similar controls which are hidden in administrative measures never made known to the public.

The review of cooperation in science and technology generally was noncontroversial, focusing mostly on recent bilateral and multilateral developments following a decline in East-West scientific cooperation after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the declaration of martial law in Poland. Many Western delegations stressed the need for increased scientific interaction independent from Eastern governmental control. The mood changed considerably following a U.S. statement reaffirming the American desire to facilitate scientific cooperation but arguing that humanitarian considerations play a significant role in determining the level of interaction between scientists of East and West. The U.S. noted, in this regard, the response of Western scientists to the banishment of physicist Andrei Sakharov to Gorky and steps taken against Soviet

scientists who seek to emigrate or do not conform politically. The Soviet delegation responded by accusing the U.S. delegate of demagoguery and claiming that American scientists who refuse to participate in research for the Strategic Defense Initiative are persecuted.

The increased importance attached to cooperation in environmental protection was very evident when the working body turned to this topic. Many delegations attached importance to the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on nuclear safety following the nuclear accident at the Chernobyl plant in April 1986. While delegates praised efforts to lower emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and chloroflourocarbons, many of them – the F.R.G., Switzerland and Austria in particular – expressed concern over the continuing degradation of their forests from transboundary air pollution. Many Eastern delegations claimed that they have taken significant steps to lower pollution levels and argued that those who are affected by pollution should assist in stopping that pollution, an obvious attempt to place part of the burden for cleaning up the environment in Eastern Europe on the West. Western delegations firmly rejected this argument, asserting that "those who pollute should pay." The Soviet delegation continued to attack the United States, attempting to divide the United States and Canada on the acid rain issue and claiming that continued U.S. nuclear testing posed a significant danger to the environment. It also attempted to make the United States appear reluctant to engage in international cooperation. The U.S. delegation defended its position and argued that actual efforts to create a cleaner environment, not just more meetings and agreements, was the ultimate goal of multilateral cooperation.

BASKET III

Overview

The review of implementation in the third basket (containing provisions on Human Contacts, Information, Culture and Education) was thorough and frank. As was characteristic of discussion in the Vienna Meeting as a whole, more Western and neutral delegations engaged in debate on humanitarian questions than at either Belgrade or Madrid. At the same time, in anticipation of Western criticism, Eastern delegations went on the offensive, putting forward ideas for post-Vienna meetings such as the Soviet proposal for a Humanitarian Cooperation Meeting in Moscow, or presenting speeches full of statistics lauding Eastern performance while cataloguing perceived Western shortcomings.

The United States, the United Kingdom and Canada were the most vocal Western participants in the third basket exchanges, while other NATO countries, notably Denmark, the F.R.G., The Netherlands and Portugal, made comprehensive statements on various problems. Of the neutral and nonaligned group, Switzerland played a forceful role in exposing potential problems with the much-heralded new Soviet passport legislation. Austria voiced similar concerns. The Vatican spoke eloquently about the need for greater access by Eastern believers to religious literature and infor-

mation, and about the desire on the part of the faithful to maintain religious ties with believers abroad. To block Western criticism, the Soviet delegation delivered a series of speeches in defense of Soviet performance. Bulgaria proved the most energetic in support of the Soviet line, with the G.D.R. and Czechoslovakia close behind. In its interventions, Poland refrained from provocative or contentious subjects, but when challenged by Western criticism, responded sharply and at length. Hungary, resting on its role as host to the Cultural Forum, focused on nondivisive issues and offered references to the cultural rights of minorities without explicitly criticizing conditions in Romania or Czechoslovakia. Neighboring Romania remained aloof from the other Eastern countries, stressing cooperative efforts in the third basket, and generally not responding to numerous Western criticisms of its performance.

In all, the United States delivered 14 speeches and made frequent interventions on the full range of Basket III topics of concern, all stemming from pervasive Eastern impediments to the free flow of people, information and ideas between and among Eastern and Western countries. These concerns included: problems of emigration and human contacts, such as restrictions on family visits, family reunification and binational marriages, especially in the U.S.S.R. and Romania; religious contacts; dual nationals; russification; treatment of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria and Hungarians in Romania as well as obstacles to Eastern peoples maintaining ethnic ties with communities abroad; penalties in the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, the G.D.R. and Romania for unauthorized contacts with foreigners and other travel restrictions; *samizdat* and persecuted unofficial publishers in the U.S.S.R., Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Hungary; censorship; mail interference; impediments to the dissemination of printed matter; jamming; treatment of journalists; problems of creation, dissemination and cooperation in the field of culture as identified at the Budapest Forum; the problems of national minorities and regional cultures; Soviet discrimination against Jews in higher education; imbalances in cultural and educational exchange; and, restrictions in Poland on the independence of universities.

Laudable for the thoroughness and impact of their presentations were Britain and Canada. The United Kingdom in particular decried jamming and the treatment of the leaders of the Jazz Section in Czechoslovakia. Canada was a major proponent of national and minority rights and cultures. The Federal Republic of Germany concentrated on freedom of movement issues and minority rights questions.

Among the specific cases raised by the United States to illustrate ongoing third basket human rights violations were: Bashkir, Latvian and Ukrainian poets Nizametdin Akhmetov, Gunars Freimanis and Anatoly Lupinos; Leningrad scholar Mikhail Meylakh; Azerbaidzhan Muslim activists A. Glukhov, A. Mutsologov and L. Belyaeva; religious activist Zoya Krakhmalnikova; U.S.-Soviet divided spouses Yuri Balovlenkov, Svetlana Braun, Viktor Faermark, Matvey Finkel, Galina Goltzman-Michelson, Igor Logvinenko and Sonia Melnikova-Eichenvald (subsequently resolved), Petras Pakenas and blocked marriage cases Viktor Novikov and Marina Vcherashnaya; divided family cases Ovsep Bayramian, Manoug

Dakessian, Meyer Khordos, Nikolay Kohut, Leonid Litvak and Pogos Tombakian; Hebrew teacher Albert Burshtein; Charter '77 members Jiri Wolf and playwright Vaclav Havel; late Nobel Laureate Jaroslav Seifert; prisoners of conscience Yuriy Shikhanovich, Feliks Svetov, Father Tamkevicius, Lev Timofeyev and Ukrainian Helsinki Monitor Josef Zisels; and deceased Moscow Monitor Anatoly Marchenko.

The United Kingdom raised in particular the cases of imprisoned Hebrew teacher Josef Begun as well as long-time refuseniks Ida Nudel, Arkadiy May and Colonels Lifshitz and Ovsicher. Britain also mentioned Czech activist Pavel Horak and G.D.R. poet Lutz Rathenow.

Human Contacts

During the discussion of the human contacts provisions of the Final Act and Madrid Concluding Document, the Soviet Union's implementation record came under a great deal of criticism by the West. Western and many neutral and nonaligned delegations repeatedly criticized the continued lack of emigration and deplored bureaucratic and procedural obstacles to emigration and travel. While welcoming the publication of the new Soviet law on entry into and exit from the U.S.S.R., Western delegations raised questions about many of its provisions, and expressed concern that the new law may actually serve to restrict, rather than facilitate, emigration.

The West, in general, was much more straightforward in raising human contacts issues than at previous review meetings, often raising the central issue of the right of an individual to leave and under his or her country. Where appropriate, the West tempered its criticism with recognition of positive developments in the East, such as the resolution of specific cases, and attempted to establish a genuine dialogue. Eastern responses ranged from extremely defensive counterattacks to, in all too few instances, serious attempts to respond to Western concerns. Many Western countries reviewed their own implementation records and responded seriously to Eastern criticisms of practices such as Western entry restrictions.

During the discussion of human contacts in the Basket III working group, Ambassador Wise gave a series of speeches outlining specific problems in Soviet and Eastern implementation. U.S. speeches focused on emigration restrictions (particularly Jewish, German and Armenian emigration), family reunification, family visits, binational marriages, dual nationals, travel and religious contacts.

Among the many specific cases raised publicly during this phase of the review meeting were those of Jewish refuseniks such as Ida Nudel, Vladimir Slepak, Naum Meiman and Albert Burshtein; U.S. divided spouses such as Galina Michelson, Petras Pakenas, Svetlana Braun, Yuri Balovlenkov, Matvey Finkel and Victor Faermark; and cancer patients Benjamin Charny, Ina Meiman and Rimma Bravve (the latter two cases have been subsequently resolved).

The implementation records of several Eastern countries also came in for criticism. While acknowledging that Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia eventually resolve most family reunification cases

and that Romania and the German Democratic Republic have relatively high levels of emigration, the U.S. registered strong concern over continuing restrictive emigration practices and overall negative attitudes toward family reunification, family visits and religious contacts.

Information

In the sessions devoted to information, the Western and neutral countries pointed to continuing Eastern problems of censorship, whether internal repression of unofficial publications (*samizdat*) or restrictions on the flow and accessibility of information from abroad. Western countries stressed the need for freedom of communication without government restriction. In the wake of the Daniloff affair, the United States critically described working conditions for journalists in the East. The United Kingdom led Western criticism on the issue of jamming, with the United States, Denmark, The Netherlands and the F.R.G. making strong and repeated interventions on the subject.

Predictably the East, and particularly the U.S.S.R., engaged in lofty rhetoric about applying breakthroughs in communications technology to the cause of peace, citing as an example the increasing use of simultaneous satellite broadcasts ("space bridges") and other cooperative efforts to promote citizen-to-citizen contacts. Eastern countries, and particularly those with financially strapped economies, argued for the conclusion of government-to-government arrangements as a means of increasing information exchange. When pressed by Western criticism, the Eastern participants pulled out reams of numbing statistics to "prove" that they took the lead in book publishing and translation of foreign works. In defense of censorship, they decried fascist and war propaganda as well as pornography in the West.

Culture

The tone and substance of debate on culture mirrored the exchanges at the Cultural Forum held at Budapest in 1985. The West elaborated on the ongoing problems of creation, dissemination and cooperation identified in Budapest. Frequent themes sounded in detail by the United States, Britain and Canada included the fate of the Jazz Section in Czechoslovakia as well as threats to minority cultures (in particular the Turks in Bulgaria, and non-Russian nationalities and Jews in the U.S.S.R.). The West also highlighted the cases of individual writers and artists persecuted or imprisoned by Eastern governments for exercising their rights to freedom of artistic expression, as well as the important role of unofficial publishing in the creation of independent culture in Poland, Czechoslovakia and other Eastern countries.

The East alternated between paean and condemnation. They expressed support for increased cultural exchange on the basis of government-to-government agreements, and spoke of the need to create a European culture of peace. They then indicted the United States for cultural imperialism, decadence and cultural genocide against minorities, as well as denial of visas to foreign writers under the McCarran-Walter Act. Patently absurd Soviet accusations against the United States met with widespread derision

among the delegates. A new low was reached when one Soviet representative declared that the United States had suppressed the popular book "One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest" (the basis of an Academy Award-winning film) and insisted that Leonard Bernstein continues to be cruelly persecuted.

Education

Subjects of primary interest to the West were the importance of intellectual integrity and freedom of thought and inquiry; imbalances in East-West educational exchanges caused by restrictive Eastern exit policies; the capricious last-minute substitution by Eastern governments of uninvited and unqualified persons to attend events in the West; problems of access to information encountered by Western students and scholars who attempt to conduct academic research in Eastern countries; the persecution of unoffical Hebrew teachers and discrimination against Jews in higher education in the U.S.S.R.; risks incurred by parents who seek to give their children a religious education in the Soviet Union; diminishing opportunites for minorities to study in their native language in Romania; and restrictive new laws in Poland threatening the independence of universities. In turn, the East criticized the United States for widespread illiteracy; inculcating anti-Communist fears in children via biased teaching methods; the banning of books by school boards; and inadequate foreign language training.

In its defense, the Soviet Union denied pursuing a policy of russification or discrimination in education. Soviet representatives also alleged that Hebrew is routinely taught and denied that Iosif Begun and other private Hebrew teachers were either qualified to give instruction in the language or that they were imprisoned for political reasons. On the subject of educational exchange, the East again expressed its preference for the conclusion of formal agreements and, according to pattern, the importance of educating coming generations in an atmosphere of peace.

MEDITERRANEAN

During the opening week of the meeting, Maltese Foreign Minister Trigona announced that Malta would propose a CSCE meeting on Mediterranean issues, including security issues. Yugoslav Foreign Minister Dizdarevic and Yugoslav CSCE representative Golub have indicated that Yugoslavia will also propose a conference on Mediterranean issues, with security questions occupying the most prominent place in such a meeting. However, both Malta and Yugoslavia have since remained silent in debate in the Mediterranean working group, and the details are not yet known.

In the contributions of the nonparticipating Mediterranean states, made November 17-18, Libya and Syria predictably savaged the United States and United Kingdom for the April raid on Libya and sanctions against Syria. However, other Arab states took a more moderate tone. The debate in the Mediterranean working group was dominated by repeated Soviet and Eastern denunciations of the United States for militarizing the Mediterranean and thus jeopardizing the security of the region. Soviet propaganda

found little support in the West or among the NNa, but there are indications that at the Vienna Meeting the East will abandon its traditional low profile on Mediterranean issues to support a Maltese or Yugoslav initiative for a conference to include Mediterranean security issues. Given traditional Western and particularly United States opposition to the introduction of such issues into the Mediterranean dimension of the CSCE, the next rounds of the meeting are likely to see sharp clashes in this area.

FOLLOW-UP

The work of the Follow-up SWB was launched mainly by the opening statement of the Finnish delegation, which suggested that consideration be given to several "guidelines" for post-Vienna activities. These guidelines included: shorter follow-up meetings and shorter intervals between them; additional experts meetings of limited duration between follow-up meetings; elimination of the expectation that all meetings should produce concluding documents; and standardization of the proceedings of experts and other meetings. In addition, some delegations questioned the need for separate preparatory meetings and suggested that steps be taken to eliminate them. In the subsequent discussions in the follow-up working body the focus was on the experience gained thus far from Follow-up meetings as well as from the various experts meeting, fora and seminars held between the Madrid and Vienna Meetings.

Many Western delegations, led by the Irish, argued that it was too early in the meeting to discuss specific follow-up activities. It was stressed that implementation was a vital part of the participating States' experience in the CSCE process and concluded that a useful discussion could not be held until after the implementation review period. The U.S. representative argued that the serious lack of implementation by some states in critical areas such as human rights and human contacts made it futile to schedule any future meetings other than the next follow-up, which is required under the Vienna mandate. Only if significant improvement in implementation occurs could the United States then consider an array of post-Vienna activities. Such activities would have to be balanced among the main areas of the Helsinki Final Act.

Eastern delegations attempted to exploit the opening statement of the Finnish delegate but were unsuccessful in drawing much reaction from the West. The British delegate took note that every Eastern statement omitted calling for further implementation reviews in future meetings. He suggested that if Eastern compliance continues to be so poor, the participating States should give consideration to having meetings that discuss nothing but implementation.

Since it is not expected that discussion in the Follow-up SWB will move forward to any great extent in the next session, only one meeting per week has been scheduled. If past practice is an accurate guide, the real work of this SWB will not get into full swing until close to the end of the Vienna Meeting.

NEW PROPOSALS

According to the agenda adopted during the preparatory conference, new proposals could not be formally considered until the final week of the first phase, although technically they could be introduced at any time. During the opening week, the East came forward with an array of major initiatives for post-Vienna meetings in all three baskets. The Soviets put forward an initiative for a human dimension conference in Moscow, the Polish delegation proposed new security meetings and the Czechoslovak delegation tabled a proposal for an economic conference in Prague. However, Eastern efforts to shift attention from the implementation review to proposals were largely unsuccessful. In general, NATO and neutral countries indicated they would pursue their own ideas for proposals during the next phase in order not to dilute the implementation review.

Proposals introduced during the first phase of the meeting include the following:

Military Security

Poland introduced a proposal for supplementing the mandate for the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) on December 8, 1986. To highlight the importance attached to the initiative, the Polish Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jan Kinast, presented the proposal in plenary. The Polish proposal provides a framework for parallel negotiations within CSCE of confidence-building measures (CBMs) and conventional forces reductions.

The Warsaw Pact states have indicated they will attempt to expand the scope of CBMs to include independent air and naval activities, a position which the NATO states have long opposed. In addition, there will be renewed efforts to expand the zone of application of CBMs to include North America (the current zone extends from the Atlantic to the Urals). While there is considerable Western support for the negotiation of enhanced CBMs – as reflected in the Brussels declaration stating NATO's call for such negotiations – the question of the need for a new mandate for such negotiations remains open.

The proposed inclusion of conventional forces reduction talks within CSCE is the most complex aspect of the Polish proposal. Many question whether the 35-nation CSCE forum is the appropriate place to discuss conventional forces reduction. During the closing days of the session the NATO foreign ministers issued a declaration in Brussels in response to the Eastern proposal. The Brussels declaration calls for distinct bloc-to-bloc negotiations on conventional forces.

Basket II Proposals

Only 3 new Basket II proposals were tabled during the first phase, all of them in plenary. Czechoslovakia introduced a proposal to hold an economic forum in Prague, while Bulgaria proposed the holding of an ecological forum. Each was supported by several Eastern delegations. Austria also introduced a proposal, on air pol-

lution and the decay of forests. These and other proposals will undergo intensive examination after the conclusion of the implementation review during the second phase of the meeting.

Human Dimension Proposals

In preparing proposals on the human dimension of the Helsinki accords, the West has focused on such chronic problem areas in the East as religious and minority rights, Helsinki monitoring, prisoners' rights, freedom of movement, contacts and information, as well as cultural freedoms. Among these proposals are a number for follow-up activities in the post-Vienna period.

The following is a brief description of the human dimension proposals for post-Vienna activity which have been mentioned or actually tabled at the Vienna Meeting to date. It is important to note that this list is open-ended, as phase II will see the introduction of more proposals on a wide range of subjects.

Denmark has indicated it is considering a post-Vienna human dimension conference, and The Netherlands has stated it is pursuing the idea of establishing a consultative commission on human rights. The Federal Republic of Germany has mentioned in plenary its interest in the establishment of cultural institutes in the signatory states and other cooperative cultural endeavors between Eastern and Western signatory states. From the neutral and nonaligned countries, Austria and Switzerland jointly have tabled a proposal designed to effect concrete implementation measures to facilitate freer movement and contacts; Yugoslavia has suggested a theatrical seminar and an architectural symposium. Interestingly, Austria has co-sponsored proposals with Eastern signatories on cultural themes. It has joined Poland in formally introducing a proposal for a symposium on cultural heritage and Hungary in tabling a proposal to establish a Bela Bartok center to preserve and disseminate European folklore.

By far the most controversial idea for follow-up activity to date has been the Soviet proposal to hold a conference on problems of humanitarian cooperation in Moscow. An indication of the high political importance the Soviet Union attaches to this idea is the fact that Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze announced it in his opening speech on November 5. Its significance was underscored when U.S.S.R. Vice-Minister Kovalev (head of the Soviet delegation to the Madrid Review Meeting from 1982-83) flew in from Moscow to formally introduce the proposal in plenary on December 10 – International Human Rights Day. However, the desired impact of the Soviet move was seriously undercut by news of the December 8 death of imprisoned Helsinki Monitor Anatoly Marchenko, whose tragic fate was marked by numerous delegations during the plenary session. Marchenko's death, not the Soviet proposal, became the principal subject of interest to the meeting and the press.

Western and neutral countries have not rejected the Soviet proposal, but have voiced grave reservations about it. Ambassador Zimmermann has stated that the U.S. decision whether to agree to the Moscow conference or *any* other CSCE meeting – and particulary one concerning human rights – will depend on the overall performance of the proposed host country. Until Soviet human rights

performance improves significantly, he said, the very idea of a humanitarian conference in Moscow flies in the face of credibility. Conditions under which CSCE meetings are held should be the same as those provided at the Madrid Meeting. Unimpeded access to the country, the meeting site and the general population by foreign press and nongovernmental visitors must be guaranteed. Individuals and groups, whether foreign or domestic, should be able freely to conduct traditional activities on the periphery of the meeting without interference by host authorities.

PROSPECTS FOR THE SECOND PHASE

The next phase of the Vienna Review Conference will run from January 27 through April 10. According to the agenda adopted at the preparatory meeting, the first week will be devoted to implementation review and consideration of new proposals for possible inclusion in a concluding document. From the beginning of the second week on February 2 through February 18, the formal focus of the conference will be on proposals exclusively, although implementation questions will inevitably be raised in the context of justifying the need for many of the new proposals.

Beginning February 19, the five subsidiary working bodies will be replaced by drafting groups on the same topics: (Basket I—principles and military security; Basket II—economic, scientific and environmental cooperation; Basket III—humanitarian cooperation; Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean; and, follow-up activities after Vienna.) The stated purpose of these drafting groups will be to assist the plenary in drafting the concluding document of the meeting. As agreed at the preparatory meeting, the first plenary session of the next phase, like the last plenary of the first phase, will be open to the public.

On the substantive side, the next phase should produce some interesting debate and maneuvering across the full range of CSCE issues. The Eastern countries have produced major proposals for post-Vienna meeting in virtually every area of the Final Act including military security, human rights, economic cooperation, the environment and cultural cooperation. In the field of human rights, the Soviet proposal for a humanitarian meeting in Moscow took most Vienna participants by surprise. The initial reaction by many Western delegations ranged from the incredulous to extremely suspicious given the Soviet human rights record and the extremely tight internal controls that Moscow exercises over the press and all aspects of public life. For the most part, the Western countries have not yet come forward with their own human rights proposals, but it is expected that some ideas will emerge shortly after the meeting resumes. Thereafter, an interesting interplay of views, including those coming from the neutral countries, should begin.

In the area of military security issues, both the East and West have indicated a willingness to engage in negotiation of further confidence- and security-building measures and to negotiate a mandate for conventional forces reductions. How and whether the ideas of the two blocs will mesh, how such negotiations will relate to the

CSCE and what role the neutrals will play should be a central focus of the next round of Vienna.

Further down the line, most likely in the third phase, the basic question of the Vienna Meeting – the relationship between further military security negotiations and the status of human rights implementation – will come to the fore and ultimately will play a decisive role in the outcome of the meeting. The Western states repeatedly have underlined the importance of significant and continuing improvement in Soviet and Eastern human rights performance as an essential requirement for a successful conclusion to the Vienna Conference.

Assuming that in order to pursue other CSCE objectives, the Soviet leaders decide to make some real progress in the human rights area, then the next issue facing the West will be the question of balance in post-Vienna activities. The proposal by the Warsaw Pact to include negotiations on conventional forces reductions within the Helsinki process could cause a heavy and possibly fatal tilt away from human rights and humanitarian concerns. Although the history of CSCE has shown that some degree of military security content within the process provides leverage for human rights progress, there is a distinct danger that too much stress on military issues could overwhelm the other elements. Such a development, if it occurred, could upset the delicate balance of the CSCE process and lead to fulfillment of the long-held Soviet goal of transforming the CSCE into a one-dimensional all-European military security forum.